Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: A Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States

Contenido principal del artículo

Matheus Lucas Hebling
Flávio Contrera

Resumen

[Poder presidencial, vetos y política pública: Un estudio comparativo de Brasil y Estados Unidos]

ABSTRACT

Much of the literature on Presidentialism focuses on the argument that bipartisan presidential systems are better able to avoid a conflictive Executive-Legislative relationship by facilitating the formation of coalitions in Congress and partisan ideological identification. From a comparative perspective, this study aims to identify and discuss the ability of the presidents of the United States and Brazil to promote public policy, and to examine the degree of conflict in the drafting of these policies by studying legislative vetoes. In addition, it analyzes the success rate of welfare bills voted in the lower chamber of the two countries and supported by their respective presidents. The period studied here covers 16 years (from 1995 to 2010 in Brazil and in the United States from 1993 to 2008), consisting of eight years of more liberal administrations and eight years of more conservative ones in each country. The presented hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between two-party or multi-party systems in terms of conflict, public policy drafting and presidential success rate. The data are analyzed using multivariate regressions and undergo qualitative treatment for a deeper understanding.

RESUMEN

Gran parte de la literatura sobre el presidencialismo se centra en el argumento de que los sistemas presidenciales bipartidistas son más capaces de evitar una relación conflictiva entre ejecutivo y legislativo al facilitar la formación de coaliciones en el Congreso y la identificación ideológica partidista. Desde una perspectiva comparativa, este estudio tiene como objetivo identificar y discutir los poderes de los presidentes de los Estados Unidos y Brasil para promover políticas públicas y verificar el grado de conflicto en la producción de dichas políticas mediante el control de los vetos legislativos. Analiza también la tasa de éxito de los proyectos de leyes de políticas de bienestar votadas en la cámara baja de los dos países y respaldados por sus respectivos presidentes. Abarca un período de 16 años (de 1995 a 2010 en Brasil y en los Estados Unidos de 1993 a 2008), con ocho años de administraciones más liberales y ocho años de gobiernos más conservadores en cada país. La hipótesis es que no hay una diferencia significativa con respecto al conflicto y la producción de políticas públicas en sistemas bipartidistas o multipartidistas y que las tasas de éxito son similares. Los datos se analizan mediante regresiones multivariables y se someten a un tratamiento cualitativo para una comprensión más profunda.

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Cómo citar
Hebling, M. L., & Contrera, F. (2019). Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: A Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States. Revista Mexicana De Ciencias Políticas Y Sociales, 64(237). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.237.65206
Biografía del autor/a

Matheus Lucas Hebling, University of Campinas

Department of Political Science, Ph.D. Candidate

Flávio Contrera, Federal University of São Carlos

Department of Social Sciences, Post-Doctoral Researcher

Citas

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