Financiamiento de campañas y cabildeo: avances y retos en el estudio de grupos de interés
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Este artículo analiza los estudios de grupos de interés y hace una revisión de los hallazgos empíricos y los retos metodológicos de dos áreas de la literatura: 1) el efecto de las contribuciones a campañas políticas sobre las decisiones públicas y 2) la influencia del cabildeo sobre las votaciones legislativas. El documento señala las limitaciones metodológicas de la literatura de grupos de interés e identifica obstáculos que evitan el desarrollo de este campo de estudio fuera de los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea.
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