Interdependent social choice: The case of equitative exchanges

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Carlos Santoyo
Marina Ménez
Rafael Prado

Abstract

Social behavior is controlled by the consequences that subjects receive for their social actions and for the reinforcement that the partner receives in the exchange. This relationships could be represented with simple lineal equations. The objective of this research is to evaluate those formulations. Twenty-eight undergraduate students were exposed, in dyads, to three games associated with different reinforcement densities. On the base line conditions, in alternating trials, subjects had to allocate to their partner one game which was constituted by a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement. At the experimental condition, subjects also had to allocate the amount of points that their partner should receive for doing the task For the different conditions of the study, data were described by Equity Theory formulations. This work extends the classical experiments of cooperation and competition, to a formal field where it is possible to integrate and evaluate formulations of different psychological approaches with the formulations of the experimental analysis of social behavior

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How to Cite
Santoyo, C., Ménez, M., & Prado, R. (2011). Interdependent social choice: The case of equitative exchanges. Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis, 17(1-2), 101–118. https://doi.org/10.5514/rmac.v17.i1-2.23296