Language and Social Institutions in Skinner and Austin

Abstract

The present paper discusses language from the standpoint of an opposition between representational views and interpretations of linguistic acts as a type of action in the world. Two sets of conceptual references guided the analysis: a) Philosophy, specifically Austin ´s analytic Philosophy; and b) Psychology, particularly B. F. Skinner ´s radical behaviorism. The paper aims to examine the relationship between language and reality, as well as the social character of linguistic practices, as these are approached in some of Skinner ´s and Austin ´s works. Some possible similarities found in the works examined are then highlighted. A first similarity refers to Skinner´s and Austin ´s adherence to an anti-representationalist view of language, and the adoption of a functional truth criterion. A second similarity is found in the role that both Skinner and Austin ascribe to conventions as they discuss the practices of a linguistic (or verbal) community. This point is discussed in the light of Wittgenstein ´s concepts of rules and criteria, Skinner´s reference to operant conditioning in a verbal community, and Austin ´s doctrine of the unhappiness. The paper also contrasts Skinner ´s view of meaning and Austion´s   reference to the illocutionary force. It is suggested that in both cases one finds the reference to the social practices which define them. One last point discussed is related to comprehension or apprehension of meaning or illocutionary force as criteria for the effectiveness of a certain performed action.