Thinking: A matter of psychology?

Main Article Content

Alejandro Leon
Hector Silva
German Morales
Virginia Pacheco
Cesar Canales
Ana Medrano
Claudio Carpio

Abstract

It is sustained that those "enigmas" that, until today, surround to the concept of "thought" are product of a deep derived conceptual incomprehension of not distinguishing between philosophical questions and scientific problems. It is pointed out that such incomprehension takes place when not recognizing the contextual nature of the terms in the ordinary language vs. the abstract and precise nature of the terms in science. Given such differences, the concept of "thought" cannot be approached directly like study objects in psychology, at least that, such concept is delimited in connection with a theoretical system and with the appropriate terminology. It is pointed out that one of the roads to elucidate the mentioned incomprehension is the identification of the empirical referents of the expressions starting from the analysis of the uses of the terms. In this context, it is analyzed the use of the expressions "thought" and "critical thought", it is identified their empiric referents and they are analyzed functionally from a naturalistic perspective. With base in the above-mentioned, the thought is characterized as mediation of linguistic interactions. It is concluded that the present analysis contributes the formulation of pertinent questions in the context of a science of the behavior.

Article Details

How to Cite
Leon, A., Silva, H., Morales, G., Pacheco, V., Canales, C., Medrano, A., & Carpio, C. (2010). Thinking: A matter of psychology?. Journal of Behavior, Health & Social Issues, 1(2), 89–97. https://doi.org/10.22201/fesi.20070780.2009.1.2.18810

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Author Biography

Alejandro Leon

Doctora en Psicologia General Experimental, UNAM