A invisibilidade da crítica Kelseniana sobre os limites da dogmática jurídica: Um senso comum teórico ainda não desvelado?

Abstract

The perception of the kelsenian theory of molding’s scope of influence, within which Law only conforms a range of possibilities that give way to almost infinite normative meanings of legal rules, is fundamental to bring into light the “common-places”, the clichés that are to be found in the superficial accounts of the kelsenian theory which, as they evaluate the Pure Theory of Law, still tend to undermine the radical distinction between the hermeneutical-epistemological plan and the plan of the hermeneutical turn to the application of Law (the traditional jurisprendece’s proper field). Parting from the contrast of these two different discursive plans, it is possible to think of a Kelsen, which is, not only the logical-formal architect from an interpretation of the first chapters
of the Pure Theory of Law, but rather presents himself as a more mordacious critic of the legal truth, as it is presented in traditional jurisprudence’s accounts, this reconsideration of Kelsen’s thought, at a first glance, seems to be paradoxal to common sense.