The Beautiful Soul and the Abstract Person. From Legal Pluralism to Ethical Sincretism

Abstract

In the present essay, the author calls into question the pluralist accounts within Law, in which,
parting from a comparison between the structure of normative systems different from State Law, and the
structure of the latter, with the aim of attributing to the first the characteristic of being a legal system,
because they presumably share the same basic characteristics. From the author point of view, this could
result in a way, not of criticizing the hegemonic capitalist legal system, but, on the contrary, in augmenting
it, because these accounts end up utilizing the categories proper of the capitalist legal system in order to
explain alternative normative systems; running the risk of destroying the alternative ethicity upon which
the last are constructed. For these purposes, the author takes into account various Hegelian notions, the
two most important: “the abstract person” and “the beautiful soul”. In the last part, the author arguments
that through “Hermeneutical Pluralism” it is possible to avoid, not only the lost of ethicity in Law, which
distinguishes modernity, but, rather, it could help to magnetize the ethicity of alternative normative systems
into abstract Law.