Integración económica internacional, autonomía nacional, democracia trasnacional: ¿una trinidad imposible?

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Published: Apr 7, 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2002.184.48331

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Giandomenico Majone
Instituto Universitario Europeo

Abstract

This paper examines three hypothesis concerning the relationship among economic integration, the nation-State and democracy. The first one, the “diminished democracy” hypothesis, claims that in an integrating world economy national policymakers are increasingly constrained in their ability to produce the public goods the voters demand. According to the second hypothesis —“transnational federalism”— this deficit should be corrected by transforming the present Union into a federal State. The third hypothesis —“transnational constitutionalism”— acknowledges that democracy cannot flourish above the national level since the peoples of the member States of the EU do not form a demos.

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How to Cite
Majone, G. (2015). Integración económica internacional, autonomía nacional, democracia trasnacional: ¿una trinidad imposible?. Revista Mexicana De Ciencias Políticas Y Sociales, 45(184). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2002.184.48331

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