Coalition governments and model of consociational democracy. Structural combinations to ensure political stability: the case of Holland
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Abstract
In spite of having a segmented society by socio-economic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences (cleavages), Holland owns a political stability that guarantees the governability. The author gives account of the implementation of the Governments of Coalition in Holland within the framework of the Consociative Democracy. Its central argument is that the limited dimension of the conflicts allows the Dutch democracy operation. Without denying the political discrepancies or oppositions, a common agreement exists in the majority of the population about fundamental questions, propped up by a tradition of consensus and common respect.
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How to Cite
Jiménez Ruiz, F. J. (2013). Coalition governments and model of consociational democracy. Structural combinations to ensure political stability: the case of Holland. Revista Mexicana De Opinión Pública, (8). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.24484911e.2010.8.41704
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